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Abstract
We charaterise the socially optimal mix of rms in an oligopoly
with both prot-seeking and labour-managed rms. The policy maker
faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a
common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pol-
lutes the environment. We study the relationship between rmsmix
and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and
the resulting policy implications.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate an industry featuring resource extraction and
polluting emissions. Producers are of two types: conventional prot-seeking
rms and labour-managed rms, sometimes called cooperatives or workers
enterprises. Hence, we deal with a mixed oligopoly as rms pursue di¤er-
ent goals. One interest of this perspective lies in the fact that, being the
maximization of value added per member/worker a labour-managed rms
objective, the resulting output contraction has a socially desirable impact
on the preservation of natural resources and polluting emissions.
We derive the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of such an industry when rms
environmental impact is unregulated. i.e., we assume away any taxation on
polluting emission, environmental standards and the like. Standard policy
instruments being absent, the policy maker may alter the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and the associated welfare by manoeuvring the access to the
industry and/or the composition of the population of rms. If market size
is large enough, We show that it is socially optimal to implement a mixed
composition in which at least one rm is labour-managed, and this holds for
any number of rms and level of xed costs. Since the environmental impact
of rms is twofold, we explore the possibility of regulating access by focussing
on the bearings of competition on the balance between resource extraction
and the environmental damage. This involves assessing the interplay betwen
the standard price e¤ect associated with producer and consumer surplus, on
the one hand, and an external e¤ect made of two components, on the other.
Since xed costs may be thought of as a production license, then we prove
that the policy maker may set the value of such a license in such a way that
the mixed oligopoly maximising social welfare entails the presence of at least
two rms and ensures the maximization of the balance between the residual
stock and the environmental damage.
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Our paper nests into a comparatively small literature investigating simul-
taneously the impact of production/consumption on resource extraction and
polluting emissions (Markusen, 1975; Tahvonen, 1991; Xepapadeas, 1995),
where, however, all rms are taken to be prot-maximising agents. This
stream of literature, in turn, falls into the broader discussion on the tragegy
of commons pioneered by the seminal papers of Gordon (1954, 1967) and
Hardin (1968). Another stream of literature our paper is related to is the
one on oligopolistic industries formed by prot-seekers exploiting common
pool resources.1
Our contribution bridges also the debate on the commons with the ex-
tant theoretical research on mixed oligopolies formed by prot-seeking and
labour-managed rms (see Horowitz, 1991; Cremer and Cremer, 1992; and
Delbono and Rossini, 1992, inter alia). The by now large literature on such
mixed oligopolies concentrates on the nature of strategic interaction between
rms with di¤erent maximands and its consequences on industry output,
price and the resulting surplus, ignoring any environmental consequence.
This omission is quite surprising also because we witness a resurgence of
interest on cooperatives. Their performance has been scrutinised during the
long slum and the empirical research seem to support the view that they
perform better than conventional rms as far as employment and survival
rates are concerned (for an excellent survey, see Perotin, 2012). The grow-
ing interest on environmental topics nowithstanding, the current debate on
cooperatives seems to ignore completely the environmental implications of
labour-managed rms objectives. Such implications might be signicant
given the relevant presence of cooperatives in many Western industries, as
plywood in the US, food, construction and manifacturing in Italy and Spain,
1See, among others, Cornes and Sandler (1983), Cornes, Mason and Sandler (1986),
Mason, Sandler and Cornes (1988) and Mason and Polasky (1994, 1997). For a survey of
this literature, see Lambertini (2013).
3
banking and insurance in Canada, UK and Northern Europe.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the setup and the preliminary equilibrium analysis of the industry. Section
3 characterises the optimal misture of rms for a given number of rms.
Section 4 deals with the optimal access to the industry. Concluding remarks
are in section 5.
2 Setup and equilibrium analysis
We consider an oligopolistic market formed by N = 1; 2; 3; :::n rms selling
a homogeneous good produced with the same technology qi = li; where qi
denotes is output and li is the amount of labour employed by rm i. The
inverse market demand function is
p = a Q; Q =
nX
i=1
qi (1)
For the moment, we assume any environmental regulation away. Firms are
di¤erent in their objective function. m 2 (1; n) are labour-managed rms
(LM) maximising value-added per worker/member:2
vi =
pqi   k
li
=
pqi   k
qi
; i = 1; 2; 3; :::m (2)
where k > 0 is a xed cost. The remaining n  m rms are prot-seeking,
maximising
j = (p  w)qj   k; j = m+ 1;m+ 2; :::n (3)
where w 2 (0; a) is the unit wage.
Production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource
whose initial stock is X > 0; with a one-to-one conversion from the resource
2We are focussing on pure LM rms, where all workers are also members and con-
versely. This is a fairly reasonable assumption, as, for instance, the average value of the
ratio between members and workers is about 0.7 in Italian production co-ops.
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to the nal good, in such a way that the residual amount of the resource
is X = X   Q. Moreover, production and/or consumption pollute the
environment via CO2-equivalent emissions E = Q; resulting in a convex
environmental damage D = bE2 = bQ2, b > 0. Accordingly, the social
welfare function is
SW =
nX
i=1
i + CS +X  D (4)
where CS = Q2=2 is consumer surplus. Notice that total producer surplus
is accounted for by prots irrespective of the actual maximand of a subset
of rms pursuing another goal.3 In the present setting, the prots of an LM
rm are
i = (p  vi) qi   k (5)
The solution concept of this oligopolistic game is the one-shot Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. The rst order conditions (FOCs) for LM and prot-
seeking units, respectively, are
@vi
@qi
=
k
q2i
  1 = 0 (6)
@j
@qi
= a  2qj  Q j   w = 0 (7)
in which Q j =
Pm
i=1 qi +
P
h 6=j qh. Now, imposing symmetry across indi-
vidual outputs within groups of rms and solving the simultaneous system
(6-7), one obtains the equilibrium outputs
qCNLM =
p
k ; qCN =
a  w  mpk
n m+ 1 (8)
where superscript CN mnemonics for Cournot-Nash. At the CN equilib-
rium, the maximised objective functions amount, respectively, to:
vCNLM =
a+ w (n m) pk m2 + (n+ 1) (n  2 (m  1))
n m+ 1 (9)
3Alternatively, one might take the presence of cooperatives literally and embed their
goal vi as such in the producer surplus and therefore also in the social welfare function.
This seems the approach suggested by Dow (2003).
5
CN =
k

m3 + (n+ 1) (m  1) (n  2m  1)+ (a  w) ha  w  pki
(n m+ 1)2
(10)
where   2n+ 1 + (n m)2 :
Before delving into the details of the mixed oligopoly we are looking at,
it is worth characterising the properties of the two polar cases in which all
rms are, alternatively, prot-seeking or LM enterprises.
2.1 All rms are prot-seekers
Here, m = 0. If so, we are facing a traditional Cournot game with increasing
returns to scale in which individual output is qCN (m = 0) = (a  w) = (n+ 1)
and equilibrium prots are
CN (m = 0) =
(a  w)2
(n+ 1)2
  k  0 8 k 2
 
0;
(a  w)2
(n+ 1)2
!
(11)
and consumer surplus is CSCN (m = 0) = n
2 (a  w)2 =
h
2 (n+ 1)2
i
; while
the resulting amount of residual resource and environmental damage are
XCN (m = 0) = X   n (a  w) = (n+ 1) and D = bn2 (a  w)2 = (n+ 1)2 :
2.2 All rms are LM
Here, m = n. If so, individual output is qCNLM (m = n) =
p
k and consumer
surplus is CSCNLM (m = n) = n
2k=2. As for the residual resource and the
environmental damage, we have XCNLM (m = n) = X   n
p
k and D = bn2k:
Since
qCN (m = 0)  qCNLM (m = n) =
a  w + (n+ 1)pk
n+ 1
> 0 (12)
which in turn implies CN (m = 0) > 
CN
LM (m = n) : Hence, we can claim
what follows:
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Lemma 1 For any given n  1; a prot-seeking industry yields higher prof-
its and consumer surplus than an LM industry. However, it depletes the
resource and pollutes more than an LM industry.
Therefore, there exists a tradeo¤ between the price e¤ect determining
the volume of prots and consumer surplus and the external e¤ect asso-
ciated with resource extraction and the emissions generated by produc-
tion/consumption. The rst e¤ect speaks in favour of prot-seeking be-
haviour, while the second one supports the adoption of rmsgoals leading
to output restrictions, as it is the case with LM rms. This tradeo¤ triggers
the analysis we are about to illustrate.
3 The optimal mix of rms in the industry
We are back into the mixed case where m 2 (1; n). At the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium
 
qCNLM ; q
CN


social welfare (4) is
SWCN =
(n m)
h
a  (n+ 1)pk   w
i h
a+ (n+ 1  2m)pk
i
(n m+ 1)2  m
p
k+X
+
(1  2b)
h
n (a  w) m

a pk   w
i2
2 (n m+ 1)2  
(n m)

a mpk   w

n m+ 1
(13)
Taking n as given, we now focus on the socially optimal distribution of rms
across groups. That is, what is the partition among LM and prot-seekers
that maximises SWCN? Putting aside the integer problem, and treating n
and m as continuous variables, the answer comes from the solution of the
following FOC:
@SWCN
@m
=
	
h
+

m (n+ 2 (1 + b))  (n+ 1)2
p
k   (a  w) 

i
(n m+ 1)2 = 0
(14)
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where 	  a  (n+ 1)pk w;   n m+1 and 
  1  2b (n m) : The
unique solution to (14) is
mSW =
(a  w) (2bn  1) + (n+ 1)
h
1 + (n+ 1)
p
k
i
2b

a  w  pk

+ 1  (n+ 2)pk
(15)
In mSW ; the second order condition writes
@2SWCN
@m2
=  
h
(n+ 2 (1 + b))
p
k   1  2b (a  w)
i4
(1 + 2b)3	2
(16)
which is strictly negative everywhere.
The last step consists in studying the properties of solution (15). For
mSW to be economically meaningful, the following constraints should be
met:
[1] mSW 2 [1; n]: at least one rm must be an LM .
[2] vCNLM

mSW
 w: this amounts to requiring that the value added be at
least as great as market wage because otherwise workers would quit
LM rms and sell their labour elsewhere.
[3] qCNLM

mSW
> 0: the equilibrium output of LM rm(s) must be positive.
To begin with, for the sake of simplicity, we dene market size as A 
a  w > 0: Then, constraint [1] requires the simultaneous satisfaction of
n mSW = A+ (1  2nb)
p
k + 1
2b

A pk

+ 1  (n+ 2)pk
 0 (17)
and
mSW   1 = A [1  2b (n  1)]  n  [1 + 2b  n (n+ 1)]
p
k
2b

A pk

+ 1  (n+ 2)pk
 0: (18)
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The numerator of n mSW is non-negative i¤
A  max
n
0; (2nb  1)
p
k + 1  A1
o
(19)
The numerator of mSW   1 is non-negative i¤
A  max
(
0;
p
k [n (n+ 1)  2b  1]  n
2b (n  1)  1  A2
)
(20)
The denominator of both is non-negative i¤
A  max
(
0;
p
k [2 (1 + b) + n]  1
2b
 A3
)
(21)
Then, it is easily checked that [2-3] are met if A satises (21). Consequently,
we are left with three conditions on market size A, implying
Proposition 2 If A > max f0; A1; A2; A3g ; then mSW 2 (1; n) :
Moreover, A1; A2 and A3 intersect each other, for any given pair (k; n) ;
in correspondence of
b =
(n+ 2)
p
k   1
2n
p
k
 bb > 0 (22)
for all k > 1= (n+ 1)2 and conversely. This immediately implies:
Corollary 3 For all k 2

0; 1= (n+ 1)2
i
; bb  0 and therefore
max f0; A1; A2; A3g = A1:
Consequently, it is socially ine¢ cient to have all rms adopting a prot-
maximising behaviour.
The intuitive explanation of this Corollary is that if the xed cost is
su¢ ciently low, entry becomes more protable and the associated indus-
try output expansion implies more pressure on the natural resource and a
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higher environmental damage. On the other hand, for the LM rms, a low
xed cost shrinks individual and industry output and therefore reduces their
impact on the resource and the environment. As a consequence, for small
levels of k, the socially optimal composition of the population of rms in
the industry is either mixed of entirely LM .
The foregoing discussion can be illustrated graphically in the space (b; A) ;
relating market size to the intensity of the environmental damage. Fig-
ure 1(i) portrays the situation in which area R1 is non-empty, i.e., k >
1= (n+ 1)2 and therefore bb > 0.
Figure 1(i) The socially optimal mix of ms when k > 1=(n+ 1)2
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We can identify three regions:
 Region R1 is dened as the locus A1 < A3 < A < A2: Here,m = 0; i.e.,
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the socially optimal composition of rmstypes collapses in a corner
solution where all rms maximise prots.
 Region R2 is the set of all point such that A is above the upper envelope
of f0; A1; A2; A3g : Here, m 2 (1; n) and therefore both types of rms
have to be active in order to maximise social welfare. This region
denes the parameter constellation in which Proposition 2 holds.
 Region R3 identies all points such that A1 > A > A3 > A2: Here,
welfare is maximised by an oligopoly consisting of LM rms only.
We can explain the above spectrum of industry composition on the basis
of the balance between a price e¤ect and an external e¤ect. By price e¤ect we
mean the standard tradeo¤ between equilibrium quantity and price along
the demand function, which is grasped by the magnitude of market size
measured by A. The external e¤ect - which here is measured by the intensity
of polluting emissions - is captured by the level of parameter b. Accordingly,
region R1 features a high value of A and a low value of b; which makes
prot-seeking rms more welfare-enhancing than LM ones (as the latter
produce less). Exactly the opposite argument applies to region R3. In the
intermediate range R2; the tradeo¤ between the two e¤ects calls for a mixed
population of rms.
Figure 1(ii) depicts the alternative case in which bb < 0 and therefore
only R2 and R3 exist in the positive quadrant. This rules out the social
desirability of an entirely prot-seeking industry.
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Figure 1(ii) The socially optimal mix of ms when k < 1=(n+ 1)2
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One may wonder whether the arising of a mixed oligopoly at the social
optimum is robust to any change in xed cost k and industry structure n.
This question amounts to controlling the non-emptiness of R2 in the positive
quadrant (remember that both A and b are strictly positive). Without any
additional proof, since @A1=@b > 0; we may claim:
Proposition 4 For all (k; n) ; region R2 always exists in the space (b; A).
In words, the mixedsolution represents the social optimum irrespective
of the magnitude of the xed cost and the number of rms. More precisely,
this is the socially desirable mixture of rms whenever the intensity of the
environmental damage is large vis à vis the market size. If k is a production
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license, the above Propositions tells us that policy maker should sell mSW 
1 licenses to LM rms and n mSW licenses to prot-seekers, for any n  2:
There remains to establish the conditions under which indeed bothmSW  1
and n  2 hold, taking into more explicit consideration the explotation of
the commons.
4 The optimal number of rms in the commons
So far, we have taken the total number of rms in the industry as given.
However, we know from the literature on the optimal access to commons in
oligopoly (cf. Cornes and sandler, 1983; Cornes, Mason and Sandler, 1986;
and Mason and Polasky, 1997, inter alia), that a central issue for the policy
maker deals with determining the number of rms allowed to exploit the
common pool.
If we tackle this issue within our setting, since we are assuming that the
policy maker is maximising SW w.r.t. m, we can envisage a perspective in
which the same policy maker wants to maximise XCN  DCN w.r.t. n. In
other words, the policy maker simultaneously calculates the social welfare-
maximising number of LM rms and the total number of rms maximising
the balance between the residual stock and the environmental damage.
The necessary condition is @
 
XCN  DCN =@n = 0; which delivers
n =
m
h
1 + 2b

A pk
i
  1
1 + 2Ab
(23)
If m = mSW ; the above expression simplies as follows:
n =  
1 + 2b

A+
p
k

2b
p
k
(24)
which is always negative. Hence, the policy maker cannot do any better
than enforcing monopoly. Since @
 
XCN  DCN =@n < 0 for all n  1, the
13
only plausible route is to pose an upper limit to the number of rms in such
a way that XCN  DCN  0 in correspondence of m = mSW :
XCN  DCN 
m=mSW
= X 
h
1 + b

A+ 1 +
p
k (n+ 1)
i h
A  1 +pk (n+ 1)
i
(1 + 2b)2
(25)
The above expression is non-negative for all
n 
(1 + 2b)
q
k
 
1 + 4bX
  2bk  pk (1 + 2Ab)
2bk
 en (26)
with en > 2 for all
X > max
8<:0;
h
1 + b

A+ 1 + 3
p
k
i
A  1 + 3pk

(1 + 2b)2
9=; (27)
If k is an entry fee (for instance, a production license), then xing
k 2
"
(A  1)2
9
;
[1 + b (A+ 1)]2
9b2
#
(28)
ensures
max
8<:0;
h
1 + b

A+ 1 + 3
p
k
i
A  1 + 3pk

(1 + 2b)2
9=; = 0 (29)
so that indeed en > 2 for all X > 0: This amounts to saying that the policy
maker may always appropriately set the entry cost so as to guarantee the
presence of at least two rms in the industry. The foregoing discussion boils
down to the following result:
Proposition 5 There exists a non empty range of k wherein the social wel-
fare is maximised by a mixed oligopoly in which the presence of at least two
rms ensures that XCN  DCN > 0:
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have charaterised the socially optimal mix of rms in an
oligopoly with both prot-seeking and labour-managed rms, whose activity
relies on natural resource exploitation and implies polluting emissions. We
have left out of the picture traditional environmental regulation instruments,
in order to focus on the bearings of industry structure and composition.
We have shown that a mixed oligopoly maximises welfare under plausible
conditions on market size, irrespective of the number of rms and the level
of entry costs. We have also investigated the possibility of regulating access
to the industry taking into consideration the balance between common pool
exploitation and the environmental damage. In this respect, we have proved
that the policy maker may set the value of the xed cost/license in such a
way that the welfare-maximising mixed oligopoly accomodates at least two
rms and grants the maximization of the balance between the residual stock
and the environmental damage.
Among possible extensions of our line of research, one worth mentioning
is the analysis of mixed oligopolies with twofold environmental externality
including at least one public enterprise in a population of prot-seekers.
This amounts to considering the publicly-owned rm as a regulatory tool
internal to the industry, as in Dragone, Lambertini and Palestini (2014),
where, however, only polluting emissions are considered.
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